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CASE COMMENTARIES 
 
BANKRUPTCY 
BAPCPA Amendment to the Bankruptcy Code: An Unconstitutional 
Restriction on an Attorney’s Right of Free Speech.  Hersh v. United States, 347 
B.R. 19 (N.D. Tex. 2006). 
By Matthew A. Petrie 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(“BAPCPA”) amended the Bankruptcy Code to include provisions that arguably 
apply to consumer bankruptcy attorneys and the manner in which they advise 
potential clients.  The BAPCPA amendments added a definition for “debt relief 
agency” in section 101(12A).  BAPCPA further added section 526, which places 
restrictions on the advice that a debt relief agency can provide to its client, as well as 
section 527, which requires certain disclosures by the debt relief agency.  The 
Northern District of Texas in Hersh v. United States was the first court to address 
whether an attorney is a “debt relief agency” under the Bankruptcy Code and, if so, 
whether the restrictions and required disclosures under sections 526 and 527 are 
constitutional. 
 The plaintiff, Susan Hersh (“Hersh”), was an attorney whose practice 
included counseling clients on matters of bankruptcy law in exchange for a fee.  As a 
result, she was potentially subject to the regulations of debt relief agencies; therefore, 
she sought a declaratory judgment that BAPCPA does not apply to attorneys and 
that both sections 526 and 527 violate the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  The government moved to dismiss Hersh’s claims.  Hersh raised three 
primary issues in this case. 
 As a threshold matter, the first issue that the court had to decide was 
whether the term “debt relief agency” includes attorneys.  The court concluded that 
under a plain reading of the statute, attorneys are debt relief agencies under the 
Bankruptcy Code.  A debt relief agency is “any person who provides any bankruptcy 
assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valuable 
consideration.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2007).  Moreover, the definition of 
“bankruptcy assistance” in section 101(4A) includes giving advice.  Because only 
attorneys are authorized to provide legal advice, and attorneys were not listed as one 
of the five exceptions to the definition, the court found that bankruptcy attorneys 
such as Hersh must fall within the definition of “debt relief agency.”  As such, 
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attorneys are subject to the regulations set forth in sections 526 and 527 for debt 
relief agencies. 
 The second issue decided by the court was whether section 526(a)(4), which 
prohibits debt relief agencies from advising clients to take on more debt in 
contemplation of bankruptcy, was an unconstitutional restriction on speech.  While 
Hersh argued that the provision should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny, the court 
held that the section was over-inclusive and therefore could not survive even under 
intermediate scrutiny, thereby avoiding the issue of determining which standard 
applies.  Both tests, however, require that a restriction on speech be narrow.  Section 
526(a)(4), however, was not narrow because it prevented attorneys from advising 
clients to take actions that are entirely lawful, even after BAPCPA, and it extended 
beyond abuse to restrict advice to take prudent actions.  Because section 526(a)(4) 
prevented lawyers from advising clients to take action that is lawful and extended 
beyond what is narrow and necessary to serve the government’s asserted interest in 
preventing abuse of the bankruptcy system, the court held that it was facially 
unconstitutional. 
 The third and final issue before the court was whether the numerous 
disclosures required by section 527 unconstitutionally compelled speech.  Section 
527 requires attorneys to provide clients or potential clients with written notice of 
specific information regarding the bankruptcy process.  The court found section 527 
constitutional because it did not unduly burden either the attorney-client relationship 
or the ability of the client to seek bankruptcy relief.  The court relied on a line of 
Supreme Court decisions addressing statutes that required a member of a profession 
to provide customers with information regarding the services that would be 
provided.  The court also found that the government “clearly has a legitimate interest 
in attempting to ensure that a client is informed of certain basic information” 
because consumer debtors are often at an informational disadvantage.  Furthermore, 
nothing in section 527 prevented an attorney from providing further specific 
explanations concerning the general required statements.  Because the content-
neutral statements required by section 527 were a sufficiently narrow means to 
ensure that clients are aware of general information regarding bankruptcy, this 
section did not violate the First Amendment. 
Although the court in Hersh determined that attorneys are debt relief agencies 
under the Bankruptcy Code and that section 526(a)(4) is unconstitutional, it is only 
one of a handful of district courts to address these issues; other courts may not 
answer these important questions the same way.  The Code provides for recovery of 
fees and for damages for even negligent violations of these sections.  It is therefore 
important, not only for consumer bankruptcy attorneys, but any attorney who 
advises clients or potential clients on any bankruptcy related matter (and therefore is 
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a debt relief agency) to ensure that he or she complies with the requirements set 
forth in the Bankruptcy Code for debt relief agencies. 
___________________ 
The Till Rate is the Proper Rate of Interest to be Paid on Secured Claims 
under Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code.  In re Shaw, 341 B.R. 
543 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006). 
By Drew H. Reynolds 
In order to determine whether to confirm a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan, 
bankruptcy courts must examine section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 
1325(a) provides that the court shall confirm a plan if the plan meets the 
requirements of nine numbered paragraphs and one unnumbered paragraph.  One of 
these paragraphs, section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), requires that creditors’ claims be paid in 
full, either at the time of confirmation of the plan, or over time with interest.  The 
paragraph does not, however, specify what rate of interest debtors must pay in order 
to satisfy the confirmation requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.  Consequently, this 
question came before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 
North Carolina, Durham Division, in In re Shaw. 
On November 29, 2005, Shaw (“Debtor”) filed a petition for bankruptcy 
protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Some time before filing her 
petition, the Debtor purchased an automobile.  In order to finance the purchase, the 
Debtor borrowed from Allegacy Federal Credit Union (“Creditor”) and, as security 
for repayment, granted the Creditor a lien on the automobile.  Both parties agreed 
that this purchase took place within the 910 days prior to the Debtor’s filing.  The 
Chapter 13 trustee filed a Notice and Proposed Order of Confirmation of the 
Debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan, which proposed bifurcating the Creditor’s claim into 
secured and unsecured portions and did not require the Debtor to surrender the 
automobile.  The Creditor objected to the plan because of the proposed bifurcation. 
The parties disputed only one issue: What rate of interest, if any, must the 
Debtor pay on the amount owed to the Creditor in order to satisfy the confirmation 
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code?  While the Creditor argued that the contract 
interest rate was the proper rate, the Debtor argued that no interest was due on the 
claim.  Both parties agreed, however, that if the court did not accept their arguments, 
the Bankruptcy Code would require interest to be paid at “the Till rate,” an interest 
rate established according to procedures outlined by the Supreme Court in Till v. SCS 
Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
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In order to resolve the issue at hand, the court first had to determine the 
relationship among sections 1325(a) and 506 of the Bankruptcy Code and the 
“Hanging Paragraph”—an unnumbered paragraph at the end of section 1325(a).  
According to section 1325(a), the court shall confirm a Chapter 13 plan if the plan 
meets the requirements of nine numbered paragraphs, as well as the Hanging 
Paragraph.  The Hanging Paragraph provides, in relevant part: 
For purposes of [section 1325(a)(5)], section 506 shall not apply to a 
claim described in that paragraph if . . . the debt was incurred within 
the 910-day [sic] preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and 
the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired 
for the personal use of the debtor . . . . 
Both parties agreed that the Hanging Paragraph applied to the Creditor’s claim; 
consequently, they agreed that section 506, which permits bifurcation of the 
creditor’s claim into secured and unsecured portions, did not apply.  The parties 
disagreed, however, on the effect of the inapplicability of section 506.  The Debtor 
argued that the Hanging Paragraph, by making section 506 inapplicable, made all the 
provisions of section 1325(a)(5) inapplicable, creating a new class of claims which 
would be paid in full with no interest.  The Creditor argued that without the 
valuation method provided for in section 506(a), secured claims covered by the 
Hanging Paragraph were required to be paid with the interest rate provided for in the 
original contract. 
 The court did not agree entirely with either argument.  It dismissed the 
Debtor’s argument that the Hanging Paragraph made section 1325(a)(5) inapplicable 
to certain secured claims, reasoning that, to agree with the Debtor’s point, it would 
have to conclude that a creditor could not be truly secured under the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Furthermore, the court found that state law initially determines a creditor’s 
rights, which may then be altered by a relevant portion of the Bankruptcy Code.  
State law, therefore, determines a creditor’s secured status, while the Bankruptcy 
Code determines the treatment of secured claims.  In making section 506 
inapplicable to certain claims, then, the Hanging Paragraph did not strip secured 
claims of their status.  Thus, the court held, section 1325(a) continued to apply to 
such claims. 
The plan did not meet the requirements of section 1325(a)(5)(C) because it 
did not call for the Debtor to surrender her vehicle, and it did not meet the 
requirements of section 1325(a)(5)(A) because the Creditor did not accept the plan.  
Therefore, the court found, the relevant portion of section 1325(a)(5) was subsection 
(B).  Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) states that the creditor is to receive “the value, as of the 
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of 
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such claim” and such value may not be “less than the allowed amount of such 
claim.” 
According to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Till, this paragraph requires the 
creditor’s claim to be paid in full, either at the time of confirmation of the plan or 
over time with interest.  In Till, the Court provided detailed instructions on how 
courts should calculate the appropriate rate of interest.  When Congress enacted the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), 
it did not change the language of Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).  Because of Congress’s 
presumed knowledge of the Till decision and its decision not to change the relevant 
language when it enacted BAPCPA, the court held that the Till rate remained the 
interest rate that must be paid to meet the requirements of section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).  
Consequently, the confirmation of the Debtor’s plan was denied. 
The court’s holding in Shaw provides several valuable lessons for 
transactional attorneys.  As Shaw illustrates, the Hanging Paragraph does not strip 
claims of their secured status; therefore, section 1325(a) continues to apply to such 
claims.  Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) requires that the creditor’s claim be paid in full, 
either at the time of confirmation or over time with interest.  Furthermore, the 
court’s holding in Shaw demonstrates that the Till rate is the proper interest rate with 
which secured claims must be paid in order to meet the requirements of section 
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).  
 
 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
 
Corporate Veil . . . or Bulletproof Vest?  Canter v. Ebersole, No. E2005-02388-
COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 401 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2006). 
By Kevin Dean 
In Canter v. Ebersole, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the Hamilton 
County Chancery Court’s dismissal of Mr. Canter’s action to pierce the corporate veil 
of Windward Pointe Townhomes, LLC (“WPT”) and hold its sole member, Richard 
Ebersole, personally liable for a breach of contract judgment.  This case 
demonstrates the difficulty an attorney in Tennessee faces when attempting to pierce 
the corporate veil. 
 In the underlying breach of contract suit, the Chancery Court of Hamilton 
County awarded Canter a $67,515.79 judgment against WPT.  WPT did not pay the 
judgment, and Canter filed suit to pierce the corporate veil and hold Ebersole 
personally liable on the judgment.   
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Canter introduced several arguments for piercing the corporate veil in this 
case.  First, he cited the fact that WPT was administratively dissolved on March 16, 
2001 (prior to this lawsuit) and was not reinstated until after the judgment was 
awarded for breach of contract.  The court found these facts irrelevant because, 
under TCA 48-217-101(b), limited liability “continues in full force regardless of any 
dissolution, winding up, and termination of an LLC.”  Second, Canter cited the fact 
that Ebersole failed to follow customary company formalities to document loans he 
personally made to WPT.  However, the court held this argument irrelevant as well, 
since failure to follow normal company formalities “is not a ground for imposing 
personal liability” on LLC members under TCA 48-217-101(e).  Third, Canter argued 
that WPT was undercapitalized (WPT’s initial capitalization was only $1,000), but 
this argument failed because the court found WPT was adequately capitalized after 
taking into consideration the loan funds that were personally guaranteed by Ebersole.   
 Canter’s fourth argument was that Ebersole dominated WPT.  After WPT’s 
only other member withdrew in April of 2001, Ebersole had sole ownership of WPT 
and exclusive authority to write checks on WPT’s account and borrow funds on its 
behalf.  Ebersole was operating the business out of his home and using his personal 
cell phone for WPT business.  This dominance argument failed as well because the 
court found that, although the facts indicated dominance, no evidence was presented 
showing Ebersole used his dominance to defraud or conduct an illegal operation. 
 Finally, Canter argued that Ebersole’s management of WPT should weigh 
heavily in favor of piercing the corporate veil.  He emphasized that debts of creditors 
other than Canter were paid, and Ebersole even used WPT’s last $20,000 to pay 
debts the LLC owed to him.  The court held Ebersole’s payment of WPT’s debts 
while he was personally liable does not establish an ulterior motive to defraud 
creditors.  The court also emphasized that Ebersole loaned WPT a total of 
$369,556.99 and was repaid less than half—$146,697.07.  Additionally, nothing in the 
record indicated Ebersole used WPT to engage in any unlawful acts. 
 The Canter case demonstrates the uphill battle a practitioner faces when 
attempting to pierce the corporate veil.  Here, the court emphasized that piercing the 
corporate veil is only appropriate in extreme circumstances, that no single factor is 
conclusive, and that it should only be used “to prevent the use of a corporate entity 
to defraud or perform illegal acts.”  See Muroll Gesellschaft M.B.H. v. Tenn. Tape, Inc., 
908 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). To succeed in an action to pierce the 
corporate veil, practitioners must be able to show that a corporate entity was used to 
defraud or perform illegal acts in order; however, following Canter, the corporate veil 
appears to be very nearly a bulletproof vest. 
___________________ 
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Deepening Insolvency in Delaware:  Corporate Directors Can Sink the Ship as 
Deep as They Want . . . as Long as They’re Not Trying To.  Trenwick Am. 
Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P. et al., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
By Christopher B. Kelly 
In Trenwick America v. Ernst & Young, the Delaware Chancery Court held that 
causes of action for deepening insolvency are not recognized under Delaware law.  
Considering a claim by the litigation trust of an insolvent corporation against its 
directors and advisors, the court recognized that the business judgment rule 
presumes the business decisions of directors are proper and that the presumption 
may not be rebutted simply by a showing that deeper corporate insolvency resulted 
from the challenged corporate decisions. 
 Trenwick Group, Inc. (“Trenwick”) was a publicly-traded insurance holding 
company comprised of various international subsidiaries.  From 1998 to 2003, 
Trenwick adopted a growth strategy that resulted in the acquisition of various other 
publicly-traded insurance companies.  A subsequent reorganization made Trenwick’s 
top U.S. subsidiary, Trenwick America Corporation (“Trenwick America”), the 
intermediate parent of all of Trenwick’s U.S. operations and significantly increased 
the percentage of Trenwick’s overall debt assigned to Trenwick America as 
guarantor.   
 Unfortunately for Trenwick, it underestimated the potential claims exposure 
of many of the insurance companies it acquired during its growth.  As a result, the 
claims made by Trenwick’s insureds eventually exceeded Trenwick’s capacity to pay 
the claims and its debt.  By 2003, Trenwick and Trenwick America had become 
insolvent, and both filed for bankruptcy within the year.  In response to the 
companies’ filings, a litigation trust was created and was assigned all causes of action 
owned by Trenwick America.   
In 2006, the litigation trust filed suit in Delaware Chancery Court against 
former directors of Trenwick, former directors of Trenwick America, and some of 
Trenwick’s former advisors, challenging two of Trenwick’s significant acquisition 
transactions.  In its suit, the litigation trust made claims of breach of fiduciary duty, 
fraud, and a somewhat unconventional claim of “deepening insolvency.”  With the 
litigation trust’s case suffering from multiple pleading deficiencies, including a 
complaint lacking facts to support an inference that Trenwick was actually insolvent 
at the time of the transactions, the Chancery Court decided the case on the pleadings 
and elected to dismiss all of the litigation trust’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
and fraud.  The court’s dismissal of the litigation trust’s deepening insolvency claim, 
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however, required no such examination of the facts; Delaware law simply does not 
recognize deepening insolvency as a cause of action. 
 As evidenced by the countless number of companies it incorporates, 
Delaware has long been a leading authority on corporate law in America.  A 
fundamental principle codified in its corporation law is the business judgment rule, 
which operates as a judicial presumption that, in any given case, corporate directors 
have acted in the best interest of their corporation, on a fully informed basis, and in 
good faith.  This presumption is based on the court’s recognition that the directors 
of a corporation are generally in the best position to make informed business 
decisions and that, absent evidence of fraud or a breach of fiduciary duty, courts 
should not judge those decisions in hindsight, regardless of their financial outcome.  
Vice Chancellor Strine recognized in Trenwick America v. Ernst & Young that this rule 
should apply to corporate directors not only in their efforts to increase company 
profitability in times of success, but also in efforts to move out of insolvency in 
times of despair.  By the same logic, Delaware law does not recognize deepening 
insolvency as a cause of action.   
 In Trenwick, the litigation trust claimed that Trenwick and Trenwick America 
were insolvent when their directors elected to acquire other insurance companies and 
that the acquisition resulted in financial loss and deeper corporate insolvency.  The 
flaw in the claim is that it is predicated on the result of the directors’ business 
decision (deeper insolvency) and not on the propriety of the decision itself (good 
faith and full information).  The deeper insolvency claim demands compensation for 
the negative outcome of the decision, disregarding the presumptions of the business 
judgment rule.  The litigation trust essentially asked the court to assume that, because 
the acquisitions made by Trenwick resulted in deeper insolvency, the directors must 
have engaged in some sort of actionable conduct.  Under Delaware law, the legal 
presumption is the opposite.  Delaware courts assume that directors of a corporation 
acted in good faith and on a fully informed basis unless the plaintiffs can rebut those 
presumptions with particularized facts.  The litigation trust failed to do so, and, as 
the court stated, “may not cure that deficiency simply by alleging that the 
corporation became more insolvent as a result of the failed strategy.” 
 The court focused on the nature of the business decision and noted that, 
“even when the company is insolvent, the board may pursue, in good faith, strategies 
to maximize the value of the firm.”  In relegating the litigation trust to traditional 
causes of action such as breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, the court supported the 
legal principle that the directors of a corporation should be positioned to make 
informed business judgments, but not to be guarantors of a particular business 
strategy’s success.  Further, this principle does not waver in times of insolvency.  
Delaware law “requires the directors of an insolvent corporation to consider, as 
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fiduciaries, the interests of the corporation’s creditors.”  Such directors cannot be 
said to have breached that duty simply by implementing a business plan that proves 
to be unsuccessful.    
 The Trenwick decision does not modify or reinterpret any rule of Delaware 
law but makes clear that the business judgment rule should be applied equally to 
corporate directors operating profitably as well as struggling business enterprises.  
Regardless of the company’s financial situation, the business decisions of the 
directors must be presumed proper.  As Vice Chancellor Strine put it, “the fact of 
insolvency does not render the concept of ‘deepening insolvency’ a more logical one 
than the concept of ‘shallowing profitability.’” 
___________________ 
The Board’s Failure to Take Action Regarding Board Member Misconduct 
May Result in a Derivative Action Against Board Members for Violation of 
Their Fiduciary Duties to the Corporation.  Memphis Health Ctr., Inc., v. Grant, No. 
W2004-02898-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (July 28, 2006). 
By Charles R. Frazier 
The Board of Directors’ fiduciary duty to the corporation requires it to do 
what is in the best interest of the corporation, even when that requirement may harm 
the Board or its individual members.  On appeal, the court in Memphis Health Center, 
Inc., v. Grant affirmed the trial court’s decision to remove the Board for its failure to 
remove or investigate the Board Chairman for conduct unbecoming of a Board 
member, in violation of company bylaws and the Board’s fiduciary duty.  
Chief Executive Officer Holman (“CEO”), Sadie Davis, and Cornelia Berry 
of Memphis Health Center (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a verified complaint 
against the Board members of Memphis Health Center (“Defendant” or “Board”).  
The complaint sought injunctive relief, both temporary and permanent, prohibiting 
the Board from, inter alia, violating the bylaws of Memphis Health Center, violating 
the rules and regulations of the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”), violating Holman’s employment contract with Memphis Health 
Center, and interfering with the day-to-day operations of Memphis Health Center.  
The Chancellor subsequently entered an order directing the Board to 
conduct a meeting to determine whether Holman should be suspended with pay 
during the prosecution of the instant derivative suit.  A court appointed Special 
Master reported on the Board’s resolution, which claimed that Holman had “covered 
up” sexual harassment complaints and had not informed the Board of the matter.  
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The Special Master stated that the suspension with pay was “not to be construed . . . 
as termination” of Holman’s employment. 
In its answer, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs did not meet the 
requirements for a derivative action, in part because Holman, as an ex officio non-
voting member of the Board of Directors, did not qualify as a “director” within the 
meaning of the applicable statutes.  The Defendants also asserted affirmatively that 
the Board had acted appropriately, exercising sound business judgment. 
 The trial court concluded that Holman was a member of the Board for the 
purposes of Tennessee’s derivative action statute.  The court also found that 
Plaintiffs Davis and Berry were members of the Board, and that the amended 
complaint stated sufficient justification for excusing the demand.  Consequently, the 
trial court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
The trial court found that the Board had an affirmative obligation to address 
conduct unbecoming a Board member, and a particular obligation to at least 
investigate the judgment of violation of the federal False Claims Act against 
Chairman Grant.  The trial court also found that the bylaws authorized the Board to 
select as well as dismiss the CEO, but that it had no authority to suspend the CEO 
with pay.  On this basis, the trial court found that the suspension of Holman with 
pay was a violation of the injunctive order.  The Defendants were found in contempt 
and they appealed. 
Generally, the proper party to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a corporation is 
the corporation itself, acting through its directors or a majority of its shareholders.  
The derivative action is a limited exception to this rule.  “Essentially, a derivative 
action is a suit brought by one or more members, directors, or shareholders of a 
corporation, on a corporation’s behalf to redress an injury sustained by or to enforce 
a duty owed to, a corporation.” 
To guard against misuse of the derivative action, preconditions to such 
lawsuits are imposed.  Section 48-56-401 of the Tennessee Code Annotated sets 
forth the requirements for a derivative action filed on behalf of a nonprofit 
corporation.  The court reviewed only those provisions relevant to the instant action.  
First, to bring a proceeding on behalf of a domestic or foreign corporation to 
procure a judgment in the corporation’s favor, the plaintiff must be a “director” of 
the corporation.  Second, each plaintiff must be a director at the initiation of the 
proceeding.  In addition, several pleading requirements must be fulfilled.  The 
complaint must be verified and must allege, with particularity, the demand made to 
obtain action by the directors.  It must explain either why the action sought from the 
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directors was not obtained or why no demand was made on the directors.  This is 
known as the demand requirement. 
Here, the Defendants contended that Holman was not a “director” of 
Memphis Health Center, as required in Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-56-
401(a)(2), and therefore had no authority under the statute to bring a derivative 
action on behalf of Memphis Health Center.  Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-
51-201(10) defines “director” as “natural persons, designated in the charter or bylaws or 
elected by the incorporators . . . to act as members of the board, irrespective of the 
names or titles by which such persons are described.”  Article III, section 3, 
subsection d (read in conjunction with other provisions) of the Memphis Health 
Center bylaws governs the composition of the Board of Directors; it states that the 
CEO is an “ex-officio non-voting member to the Board.”  The court concluded that, 
considering all of the bylaw provisions, an ex officio member of the Memphis Health 
Center Board of Directors falls within the meaning of the term “director” in section 
48-51-201(10) and therefore has standing to maintain a derivative action against the 
corporation. 
Section 48-56-401(c) of the Tennessee Code Annotated requires a derivative 
action complaint to “allege with particularity the demand made, if any, to obtain 
action by the directors . . . or why [the plaintiffs] did not make the demand.”  
Tennessee case law provides that the demand requirement may be excused.  
Typically, in a “demand excused” case, a plaintiff claims that a demand would be 
futile because the board is interested and not independent, and, consequently, the 
court examines the interest and independence of the corporate decision-makers.  
In this case, the amended complaint alleged that any demand “would be 
futile in that the Defendants have a direct interest in continuing to breach their 
fiduciary duty and violate the Bylaws and federal rules and regulations, and, 
therefore, are not independent.”  The trial court heard this argument as part of the 
Defendants’ oral motion to dismiss; it noted that while the evidence at trial might 
show that the demand should not be excused, the allegation in the amended 
complaint was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.  Thus, the court found no 
error in the trial court’s conclusion on this issue. 
The Defendants next argued that the trial court erred in denying the motion 
to dismiss because the derivative action was brought without being verified.  
Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-56-401(c) provides that a complaint in a 
derivative action must be verified.  The Defendants acknowledged that the original 
complaint was verified by Plaintiff Holman, but contended that she was not 
competent to do so because, as only an ex officio Board member, she had no standing 
to file the derivative action.  As noted above, the court concluded that, under the 
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circumstances of this case, Holman had standing to file the lawsuit, and therefore her 
verification of the original complaint was sufficient.  Thus, the court found no error 
in the trial court’s holding on this issue. 
Without citation to authority, the Defendants asserted that a violation of the 
bylaws of a corporation, a violation of an employment contract, and a violation of 
federal rules and regulations are not recognized causes of action on behalf of a 
corporation in Tennessee.  From the court’s review of the amended complaint, 
however, the Plaintiffs primarily alleged a breach of the Board members’ fiduciary 
duty to the corporation.  It is undisputed that the directors of a corporation owe a 
fiduciary duty to the corporation to “faithfully pursue the interest of the 
organization, and its nonprofit purpose, rather than his or her own financial or other 
interests, or those of another person or organization.”  If the directors breach their 
fiduciary duty, they may be held jointly and severally liable to the corporation.  
Consequently, this argument was held to be without merit. 
Here, one of the Plaintiffs’ primary allegations was that the Board Chairman 
was found to have committed thousands of violations of the federal False Claims 
Act, and that the Board refused to take action to remove him or even to investigate, 
and that this inaction was a violation of their fiduciary duty to Memphis Health 
Center.  This allegation was clearly actionable.  Consequently, this argument was also 
held to be without merit. 
As the Memphis Health Center case illustrates, a Board of Director’s fiduciary 
duty requires it to pursue the interests of the corporation, even when corporate 
interests conflict with the interests of the Board or its individual members.  Ex officio-
type provisions can be used as a check and balance against a self-serving Board, thus 
promoting integrity in corporate governance.  Because the unchecked power of a 
Board of Directors could harm a corporation, transactional lawyers should advise 
corporate clients to include provisions in their bylaws that will give corporate officers 
standing to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. 
___________________ 
Negligence Claim Cannot Sustain Deepening-Insolvency Cause of Action.  In 
re CitX Corp., 448 F.3d 672 (3rd Cir. 2006). 
By D. Leigh Griggs 
Under Pennsylvania law, only fraudulent conduct is sufficient to support a 
deepening-insolvency claim; allegations of negligent conduct do not qualify.  This 
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was the issue decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
In re CitX Corp. 
In In re CitX Corp., a debtor-Internet company (“CitX”) was involved in an 
illegal Ponzi scheme and used its financial statements, compiled by its accounting 
firm, to attract investors.  CitX’s only significant customer, Professional Resources 
Systems International, Inc. (“PRSI”), was a fraudulent enterprise and was shut down 
by the Florida Attorney General.  At the time that PRSI’s business was terminated, it 
owed CitX 2.4 million dollars.  The PRSI receivable remained an asset on CitX’s 
balance sheet long after PRSI was shut down, thus permitting CitX to show a 
positive balance sheet.  Thereafter, CitX was able to raise more than one million 
dollars in equity, thereby prolonging its existence.  Within eighteen months, CitX 
spent the investors’ money, incurred millions more in debt, and subsequently filed 
bankruptcy.  A bankruptcy trustee was appointed; the trustee sued the accounting 
firm and the accountant responsible for compiling the financial statements for, 
among other things, “deepening insolvency.”  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the accounting firm.  The trustee appealed 
In determining whether summary judgment on the deepening-insolvency 
claim was proper, the court of appeals first examined the trustee’s complaint.  The 
trustee alleged that the accounting firm missed many “red flags” and that it should 
have known about the errors in the financial statements that eventually caused harm 
to the company.  The court noted that the complaint scarcely made out, and the 
evidence fell short in sustaining, any claim of fraudulent conduct on the accounting 
firm’s part.  Without fraud, the trustee had to depend solely on his claim that the 
accounting firm negligently deepened the company’s insolvency.  Thus, the court had 
to determine whether a claim of negligence could support a deepening-insolvency 
cause of action.               
In addressing this question, the court returned to its only other opinion 
dealing with “deepening insolvency”: Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. 
Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3rd Cir. 2001).  In Lafferty, the court defined “deepening 
insolvency” as an injury to the debtor’s company property from the “fraudulent 
expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life.”  While noting that 
certain cases support the contention that a claim of negligence could suffice to 
sustain a deepening-insolvency cause of action, the court rejected this position, 
stating that Lafferty held only that fraudulent conduct would sustain a deepening-
insolvency claim under Pennsylvania law.  The court found no reason to extend the 
scope of deepening insolvency.  Holding that a claim of negligence could not 
support a deepening-insolvency cause of action, the court affirmed the judgment 
below, maintaining that the trustee failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact 
to support the allegation that the accounting firm engaged in fraudulent conduct.                                 
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Although popular belief following the Lafferty decision was that Third Circuit 
courts were more receptive to the deepening-insolvency issue than other courts, the 
In re CitX Corp. case signals a willingness of the Third Circuit to reconsider Lafferty’s 
holding that “deepening insolvency” is a cause of action under Pennsylvania law.  At 
the very least, it appears clear that In re CitX Corp. has made future claims of 
deepening-insolvency harder to plead and maintain.  Before bringing future 
deepening insolvency claims, plaintiffs should determine which state’s law applies 
and review the case law to determine the particular elements that must be pled to 
allege fraud.  In defending a claim of deepening insolvency, one should question the 
validity of the claim as a separate cause of action in the state in which the complaint 
is brought, and also question whether it is duplicative of an existing cause of action 
under state law, such as fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. 
___________________ 
The Business Judgment Rule Expanded in Disney.  In re the Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
By Rachel O. Park 
Delaware law presumes that, in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the 
actions taken are in the best interest of the company.  In In re the Walt Disney Company 
Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court considered whether the Board of 
Directors of the Walt Disney Company were entitled to this presumption when they 
(1) drafted and agreed to the Ovitz Employment Agreement (“OEA”); (2) fired 
Michael Ovitz, president of the company, without cause; and (3) paid Ovitz the 
contracted-for severance payment, valued at approximately $130 million, even 
though he had only worked at Disney for 14 months.  
In 1994, the Disney Board of Directors decided to name a president and 
future successor to the late President Frank Wells and interim President Michael 
Eisner.  The prime candidate for the position was Michael Ovitz, the leading partner 
and one of the founders of Creative Artists Agency (“CAA”), a premier talent 
agency. 
Because of the income Ovitz received from CAA, Disney’s Board realized 
that several financial assurances would have to be promised to Ovitz in order to 
assure that he would leave CAA and join the Disney team.  As such, Irwin Russell, a 
Disney director and chairman of the compensation committee, began negotiating the 
financial terms of Ovitz’s employment agreement (“OEA”).   
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The first draft of the contract was modeled after Eisner’s and Frank Well’s 
employment contracts.  In addition to the draft, Russell prepared a “case study” for 
Ovitz and Eisner to explain the terms of the OEA, including the extraordinary level 
of compensation that Ovitz would be receiving.  Russell also hired an executive 
compensation consultant to help him evaluate the financial terms of the OEA.  
Concerned with the annual income Ovitz would receive over the course of his five-
year OEA, approximately $23.9 million, and his ability to receive an additional 
windfall of $50 million under the current wording of the OEA, Russell began 
rewording the draft OEA.   
However, before Russell and the compensation consultant were able to 
determine a reasonable compensation package, Eisner and Ovitz agreed to a separate 
OEA.  On August 14, 1995, Eisner and Ovitz signed an agreement, which outlined 
the basic terms of the OEA, and stated that the agreement would be subject to the 
approval of Disney’s compensation committee and Board of Directors.  After the 
agreement was signed, Eisner and Russell called the members of the Board and the 
compensation committee to inform them of the impending new hire, to explain 
Eisner’s friendship with Ovitz, and to detail Ovitz’s qualifications.  That same day, 
public reaction to Ovitz’s hiring was extremely positive.  Disney was applauded for 
the decision, as its stock price rose 4.4% in a single day, thereby increasing Disney’s 
market capitalization by over $1 billion.   
On September 26, 1995, the Disney compensation committee met to discuss 
the proposed terms of the OEA.  The topics included the historical comparables of 
Ovitz’s contract to that of Eisner and Wells, as well as the size of the option grants.  
The committee unanimously concluded that it had enough information to approve 
the terms of the OEA.   
Immediately after the compensation committee meeting, the Disney Board 
met to discuss the OEA.  Eisner led the discussion relating to Ovitz.  Raymond 
Watson, a member of the compensation committee, discussed the financial analysis 
used by the committee in approving the OEA.  Both Watson and Russell answered 
questions from the Board.  After further deliberation, the Board voted unanimously 
to elect Ovitz as President.   
Ovitz’s tenure as President of the Walt Disney Company officially began on 
October 1, 1995.  The initial reaction was positive.  However, over time opinions 
towards Ovitz began to change.  By the fall of 1996, the Disney directors were 
resigned to the fact that Ovitz would most likely have to be terminated.      
On September 30, 1996, the Disney Board met to discuss Ovitz and his 
future employment with Disney.  Eisner told the board members of the continuing 
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problems that he and others were having with Ovitz, of his own personal lack of 
trust of Ovitz, and of Ovitz’s failures to adapt to Disney’s culture.  After this 
meeting, Eisner began searching for ways to relieve Disney of its obligations to pay 
Ovitz his severance payout under the OEA.  He began negotiations with Sony to 
“trade” Ovitz.  These negotiations, however, quickly dissolved.  Additionally, Eisner 
began working with Sanford Litvack, Disney’s General Counsel, to explore whether 
the company could terminate Ovitz “for cause,” thus relieving Disney of its 
severance payout obligation under the “non-fault termination” provision in the 
OEA.   
After consulting Val Cohen, co-head of Disney’s litigation department, 
Joseph Santaniello in Disney’s legal department, and “anybody else that [Eisner] 
could find that had a legal degree,” it was determined that no basis existed to 
terminate Ovitz “for cause.”  Moreover, Litvack believed that attempting to avoid 
legitimate contractual obligations by forcing Ovitz to negotiate for a smaller non-
fault termination severance payout would harm Disney’s reputation as an honest 
business partner and would affect its future business dealings.   
Following a Board meeting on November 25, in which the Board determined 
that Ovitz’s termination was inevitable, Eisner set up a meeting with Ovitz to discuss 
his termination.  After discussing several concessions, all of which Eisner rejected, 
Ovitz walked off the Disney property for the last time on December 11, 1996.  
Ovitz’s termination was memorialized in a letter, dated December 12, 1996 and a 
press release was issued that same day.  Shortly thereafter, Disney paid Ovitz what 
was owed under the OEA for a non-fault termination.   
One month after that payment, shareholders of the Disney Corporation 
brought derivative actions on behalf of the Disney Corporation against Eisner and 
the board of directors (“Defendants”) claiming, among other things, that because 
Defendants breached their fiduciary duties under the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, their actions should not be protected under the business judgment rule.  The 
Court of Chancery for the County of New Castle ruled in favor of the Defendants, 
finding that the director Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties and, as 
such, were protected by the business judgment rule.  Disney’s shareholders timely 
appealed.      
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, 
holding that the Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties because no 
reasonably prudent fiduciary would have acted differently.  Thus, the court 
concluded that the Defendants’ decisions to approve Ovitz’s employment 
agreement, to hire him as president, and then to terminate him on a no-fault basis 
were protected business judgments made without any violation of a fiduciary duty. 
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In so holding, the court explained that Delaware law presumes that, in 
making a business judgment, the directors of a corporation act in an informed basis, 
in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken is in the best interests of 
the company.  Those presumptions can only be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that 
the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care or loyalty or acted in bad faith.  If 
that is shown, the burden then shifts to the defendants to demonstrate that the 
challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.  
 On appeal, Plaintiff shareholders argued that Defendants violated their 
fiduciary duties by approving the OEA with a non-fault termination provision that 
resulted in an enormous payout without informing themselves, at the time the OEA 
was drafted, of the full magnitude of that payout.  The trial court and the Delaware 
Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument and held that the Board was 
reasonably informed when it made its decision.  Despite the imperfections, the court 
stated, the evidentiary record was sufficient to support the conclusion that the 
compensation committee, Eisner, and the entire Board had adequately informed 
themselves of the potential magnitude of the entire severance package, including the 
options that Ovitz would receive in the event of an early non-fault termination.  
Although not in compliance with corporate governance “best practices,” the court 
concluded that there was still enough evidence in the record to support the trial 
court’s finding that the Board was reasonably informed.  Moreover, the Delaware 
Supreme Court concluded that, even if Defendants were grossly negligent in their 
decision to hire Ovitz, grossly negligent conduct, without more, does not and cannot 
constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith.    
Because Plaintiff shareholders were unable to carry the heavy burden of 
showing that the Defendant directors of the Walt Disney Company breached their 
fiduciary duty of care or acted in bad faith, the business judgment rule protected the 
actions of the Board. 
 
 
CONTRACT LAW 
 
Enforceability of Liquidated Damages Provision in Employment Contract 
Determined Using Prospective Approach.  Anesthesia Med. Group, P.C. v. Buras, 25 
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 441, 2006 WL 2737829 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2006). 
By Jennifer G. Rowlett 
A liquidated damages provision in an employment contract will be upheld if 
it satisfies enforceability requirements when analyzed from a prospective approach.  
In Anesthesia Medical Group, P.C. v. Buras, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reaffirmed 
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the prospective approach established in Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88 (Tenn. 
1999) with its decision to enforce the liquidated damages provision of a medical 
group employment contract against a breaching employee.  
 In Anesthesia Medical Group, P.C. v. Buras, Paul Buras, a registered nurse, 
applied and was accepted into a sponsorship program with Anesthesia Medical 
Group (“AMG”) in which AMG sponsored the education of students seeking to 
become certified registered nurse anesthetists (“CRNAs”) in exchange for their 
future employment with AMG.  Buras executed a contract with AMG on March 24, 
1999.  The contract provided that AMG loan Buras up to $22,500 for tuition in 
exchange for Buras’s promise to work for AMG at the conclusion of his CRNA 
training and certification.   
By entering the contract, Buras promised to begin full-time employment with 
AMG within thirty days of CRNA certification and promised to work for AMG for a 
period of three years.  Successful completion of the three-year commitment resulted 
in forgiveness of the tuition loan.  Alternatively, the contract provided that failure to 
satisfy the three-year commitment to AMG at the conclusion of the CRNA program 
obligated Buras to repay the tuition loan as well as additional payments.  The 
additional payments enumerated in the contract were $15,000 if he resigned or was 
terminated for cause within the first twelve months of employment; $10,000 if the 
same occurred during the second twelve months; and $5,000 if it occurred during the 
third twelve months.  
 Buras borrowed the entire $22,500 available from AMG, completed the 
CRNA program, and started work for AMG on November 7, 2001.  However, on 
July 18, 2002, Buras sent a letter of resignation to AMG, declaring his intention to 
pursue work as a locum tenens, a temporarily employed CRNA who receives a daily 
wage instead of an annual salary.  Buras’s last day of work with AMG was on August 
16, 2002.   
 AMG filed suit on October 25, 2002 seeking to enforce the contract against 
Buras.  Breach of contract was not at issue because Buras admitted his breach.  Thus, 
the trial court awarded AMG partial summary judgment and ordered Buras to repay 
the tuition loan as well as some other fees and costs.  The liquidated damages issue 
went to trial.  The trial court found the $15,000 liquidated damages provision 
unenforceable as a penalty to the breaching party.  
 On appeal, the court analyzed the enforceability of the liquidated damages 
provision by applying the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc.  
In Guiliano, the Court adopted a prospective approach to the fundamental 
requirements of a valid liquidated damages clause.  Those requirements are (1) that 
2007] CASE COMMENTARIES  463 
 
the amount of damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the amount of actual 
damages that would likely be sustained in the event of a breach and (2) that the 
actual amount of damages must be difficult to determine.  Also, a liquidated damages 
provision will not be enforced if it is found to be a penalty to the breaching party as 
opposed to a reasonable way to ensure that the non-breaching party will be 
compensated for damages.  The Guiliano holding calls for these requirements to be 
evaluated at the time the parties entered the contract.   
 Thus, the court examined the AMG employment contract using the 
prospective approach and ultimately held that the liquidated damages provision was 
enforceable.  First, the court determined that AMG would suffer foreseeable 
damages if Buras failed to complete the three-year employment commitment because 
of the significant costs involved in finding temporary and permanent replacements to 
cover Buras’s duties.  Second, the court held that it would be difficult to estimate the 
actual amount of damages that AMG would suffer at the time of contract formation 
because of unpredictable facts such as the timing of breach.  Finally, the court 
determined that the agreed amount of liquidated damages specified in the contract 
($15,000) was a reasonable prediction of the amount of potential damages that AMG 
would incur in replacing Buras if he failed to complete his employment commitment.  
Hence, by utilizing a prospective method of analysis, the court determined that the 
liquidated damages clause was valid, and by enforcing the clause, the court was 
adhering to the parties’ original intentions.  The court awarded judgment to AMG in 
the amount of $15,000 in liquidated damages based upon the contract provision.  
 As Anesthesia Medical Group, P.C. v. Buras illustrates, Tennessee courts 
determine the enforceability of a liquidated damages provision in an employment 
contract based upon its reasonableness at the time of contract formation.  Thus, the 
continuing challenge for drafters of employment contracts is to prepare liquidated 
damages provisions that are reasonable predictions of potential damages in the event 
of breach.  
___________________ 
Joining the Majority: Tennessee Changes Its Statute of Frauds.  Blair v. 
Brownson, 197 S.W.3d 681 (Tenn. 2006).   
By Scott Griswold 
The Tennessee Supreme Court and General Assembly have amended the 
statute of frauds to provide that the “party to be charged” is the party against whom 
enforcement of the contract is sought.  This amendment modifies the previous rule 
that the “party to be charged” is limited merely to the seller of real property.  This 
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modification brings Tennessee in line with the majority view.  Tennessee’s statute of 
frauds, which is consistent with many other jurisdictions, states that “no action shall 
be brought, . . . upon any contract for the sale of lands, . . . unless the promise or 
agreement, upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note 
thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged.”  Prior to the 
Supreme Court’s and legislature’s policy shift, the lower courts were bound to an 
antiquated and minority view that the statute was a “defensive tool for the owner of 
real property.” 
In Blair, Rena Mae Blair, the plaintiff/appellee, sold improved real property 
to Rollin and Mary Ann Brownson, the defendants/appellants, at a foreclosure 
auction conducted by a local attorney.  Following the sale, the attorney drafted a 
deed conveying the property in fee simple to the Brownsons.  Ms. Blair’s lawfully 
authorized agent signed the deed, but did not deliver it to the Brownsons.  The 
Brownsons never signed the deed.  Subsequently, the Brownsons had the property 
appraised; however, the appraiser’s report stated the house was worth significantly 
less than the purchase price.  As a result, the Brownsons reduced their offer for the 
property to match the appraised value.  Ms. Blair demanded the original purchase 
price, but the Brownsons refused to close the transaction, announcing that they no 
longer wanted the property. 
Ms. Blair sued and sought specific performance of the contract for sale of the 
land.  In their answer, the Brownsons asserted that the statute of frauds provided an 
affirmative defense since the agreement was for the sale of real property and only the 
seller had signed the deed.  The trial judge granted Ms. Blair’s request for specific 
performance.  The Brownsons appealed the order and raised the following issue for 
review: “whether the deed, which was drafted after the foreclosure sale and signed 
only by [Ms. Blair’s agent], suffices to satisfy the statute of frauds.”  Judge Susano, 
writing for the Eastern Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, affirmed the trial 
court and held that, “in light of our precedent, we find the deed has been signed by a 
lawfully authorized agent of the party to be charged” and, therefore, the statute of 
frauds was satisfied.  While the Court of Appeals noted there was relatively little case 
law concerning the matter, it asserted that any changes in public policy had to come 
from either the Supreme Court or the legislature.  
In the wake of the intermediate appellate court’s ruling, the General 
Assembly amended Tennessee’s statute of frauds to expressly state that the “party to 
be charged is the party against whom the enforcement of the contract is sought.”  
This statutory change bolstered the Supreme Court’s rationale, which stated that 
“buyers and sellers should receive equal protection in the process of the sale of land 
so that neither stands to be unduly benefited or disproportionately burdened by the 
fact that the contract has not been reduced to writing.”  The Supreme Court 
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expressly overruled previous precedents that construed the “party to be charged” as 
the seller and reiterated the new rule stated in the statutory modification. 
Consequently, sellers of real property will not be able to sign a deed and then 
use it as a sword to force buyers into specifically performing oral contracts.  Seeing 
the potential for abuse in the real property market, Tennessee’s policy makers 
reacted quickly and concisely to return the statute to its intended defensive position.  
The new interpretation of the “party to be charged” clarifies this important area of 
the law and adds predictability for practitioners in advising their clients.     
 
 
INSURANCE 
 
Unambiguous Language is Necessary for Insurance Subrogation Rights.  
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 195 S.W.3d 609 (Tenn. 2006). 
By Nicholas C. Zolkowski 
Insurance companies may utilize subrogation rights to “step into the shoes” 
of an insured party in order to inherit that party’s payment rights.  Allstate Insurance 
Company v. Watson, however, illustrates the importance of language and intent in 
contracts, and how they can ultimately affect the insurance company’s subrogation 
rights.  
Kevin Williams (“Williams”), the owner of a duplex, leased a unit of the 
residence to Robert Watson (“Watson”).  The lease contained a clause that stated 
Watson would be “responsible for all damages to the apartment, intentional or non-
intentional.”  Williams later procured a fire insurance policy through Allstate 
Insurance Company (“Allstate”) in case of fire damage.  
In June 1995, a fire occurred and damaged the duplex unit.  Williams was 
neither intentionally nor negligently responsible for the fire.  The amount of damages 
was $25,788.47.  Allstate paid Williams the cost of the damages.  Allstate then sued 
Watson under a subrogation claim, as Watson would have been liable to Williams 
had no fire insurance policy existed.  
The trial court construed the “intentional or non-intentional” language of the 
lease clause to mean that Watson was strictly liable for all damages to the duplex, and 
ruled in favor of Allstate’s subrogation request.  On appeal, the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Williams and Watson were co-insureds 
and therefore had no hierarchy of rights for Allstate to subrogate. 
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 The Supreme Court analyzed the issue of subrogation based on the language 
of the contract.  In order for Allstate to have a subrogation right, its insuree, 
Williams, would need to be entitled to payment from Watson, and that right would 
be construed from the lease contract.  The court stated that it would usually interpret 
a contract to discern the parties’ intent based on the literal meaning of the language 
used, unless the language was ambiguous.  If the language was found to be 
ambiguous and to potentially have more than one meaning, then parole evidence 
could be used to determine the true intent of the parties. 
 The court found the lease clause ambiguous because the term “non-
intentional” could be interpreted as meaning either “strictly liable” or “negligently.”  
Therefore, parole evidence was necessary to ascertain what Watson and Williams 
intended the clause to mean, and the contract drafter was brought to testify.  The 
drafter stated that Watson and Williams had not intended to hold Watson strictly 
liable, but only for negligent or intentionally caused damages.  Watson would have 
needed to be responsible to some degree of fault in order to be liable to Williams.  
The court therefore held, based on this clarified construction of the lease, that 
Watson was not liable.  Since Watson was not liable to Williams, Allstate was barred 
from subrogating, and the case was dismissed. 
This case demonstrates the importance of using precise and clear language in 
contracts that explains conditions thoroughly.  While the intended meaning may be 
obvious to the drafters, third parties may misconstrue slight ambiguities into 
unintended meanings.  This case also demonstrates that if a party desires to use any 
subrogation rights, it should take precautions to ensure it is entitled to do so. 
 
 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
Absent Allegations of Fraud, State Law Claims Based on Activities that 
Occurred During Federal Patent Prosecution will be Preempted by Federal 
Patent Law.  Coker v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. W2005-02525-COA-R3-CV, 2006 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2006). 
By Melissa C. Hunter 
Any state cause of action that conflicts with federal patent laws is preempted 
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.  Nevertheless, 
claims derived from state laws that overlap with federal patent laws may escape 
preemption if the laws do not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal 
patent objectives.  State laws that impose liability on patent-holders who obtained 
the patent through deliberate fraud before the Patent and Trademark Office do not 
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interfere with the purposes of federal patent laws; as such, lawsuits based on these 
laws will not necessarily be preempted.  The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed 
dismissal of a complaint that sought to impose state tort liability based on actions 
protected by federal patent laws in Coker v. Purdue Pharma Co.   
 The lawsuit in Coker followed on the heels of an opinion rendered in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.  The defendant 
Purdue Pharma Company (“Purdue”) holds patents for the drug OxyContin.  After 
Purdue learned that a generic drug company sought to manufacture and sell a drug 
equivalent to OxyContin before the expiration of Purdue’s patents, Purdue filed a 
patent infringement suit against them in the district court.  The district court held 
that Purdue committed inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”), which rendered their OxyContin patents unenforceable.  Based on that 
decision, Coker filed a class action suit against Purdue in a Tennessee state court 
alleging three causes of action:  Tennessee Trade Practices Act violations, Tennessee 
Consumer Protection Act violations, and common law monopolization.  Purdue 
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings before the state trial court.  The trial 
court granted Purdue’s motion and dismissed Coker’s complaint.  Coker appealed, 
asserting that the complaint was sufficient to avoid federal preemption and that the 
trial court erred in dismissing the complaint.   
 The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires that state 
laws conflicting with federal law must be preempted.  In determining whether 
preemption is appropriate, a court must look to the congressional purposes to 
determine if the state law serves as an obstacle to those federal purposes.  The 
United States Supreme Court has held that laws punishing individuals for fraud in 
obtaining a patent do not interfere with federal patent law objectives; however, the 
Federal Circuit has held that federal patent law prevents state tort law liability based 
on actions occurring before the PTO unless “the conduct amounted to fraud or 
rendered the application process a sham.”  Accordingly, the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals held that Coker’s complaint must be dismissed unless it alleges fraudulent 
conduct before the PTO. The appellate court in Coker determined that the 
complaint did not contain allegations that Purdue engaged in fraud before the PTO 
when it was prosecuting its patents for OxyContin.  Coker argued that the United 
States District Court’s determination that Purdue acted inequitably establishes the 
requisite fraud to avoid preemption.  The court of appeals rejected this argument, 
noting the difference between inequitable conduct and fraudulent conduct.  Next, 
the Coker court examined the complaint itself.  The complaint alleged that Purdue 
made “material misrepresentations” before the PTO, but these allegations fell short 
of fraud, defined as an intent to deceive. 
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Lawyers drafting complaints for claims arising from a patent-holder’s 
representations before the PTO should not file suit in a state court unless the 
complaint contains sufficient allegations of fraudulent conduct.  Since the Tennessee 
Rules of Civil Procedure contain heightened pleading requirements for fraud, the 
alleged fraudulent conduct must be stated with particularity.  As Coker illustrates, to 
avoid preemption and dismissal of a suit, complaints alleging state law claims that 
overlap with federal patent laws must be written carefully to demonstrate that the 
state law claims do not interfere with federal patent law objectives. 
 
 
INTERNET 
 
Defamation in Cyberspace:  Who Is Immune From Liability Under The CDA 
and What Constitutes A “User” Under the Act?  Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 
(Cal. 2006). 
By Jessica A. Webb 
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) often has been 
interpreted as conferring broad immunity against defamation liability for those who 
publish information on the Internet that originated from another source.  The CDA 
provides in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”  The Act further provides in 
section 230(e)(3) that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”  The 
court in Barrett v. Rosenthal ruled on three issues:  (1) whether section 230 of the CDA 
applies to distributors as well as publishers; (2) the definition of the statutory term 
“user;” and (3) whether the immunity provision of section 230 made a distinction 
between active and passive users of the Internet.  The court held that section 230 
prohibits distributor liability for Internet publications and that there is no distinction 
between active and passive use of the Internet.   
The plaintiffs in Barrett operated web sites devoted to exposing health frauds; 
the defendant operated an Internet discussion group.  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant committed libel by maliciously distributing defamatory statements via e-
mails and Internet postings that impugned the plaintiffs’ character and competence 
and disparaged their efforts to combat fraud.   The trial court granted the 
defendant’s motion to strike under an anti-strategic lawsuit against public 
participation statute, but the court of appeals vacated the order insofar as it applied 
to one of the plaintiffs.  The court of appeals held that section 230 did not shield the 
defendant from liability under the common law of defamation as a “distributor.”  
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 The Supreme Court of California held that the CDA immunity provision 
applied to distributors, that the term “user” in the CDA immunity provision applied 
to an individual such as the defendant, and that there is no distinction between active 
and passive users of the Internet.  Further, the court noted that the plaintiffs were 
limited to pursuing the originator of the allegedly defamatory publications.    
 The court took into account two main considerations in determining whether 
distributors were liable under section 230.  First, the court started its analysis by 
evaluating the leading case on section 230 immunity: Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).  The court agreed with the decision in Zeran and held that 
allowing distributor liability would dramatically impact Internet service providers.  
Congress did not intend to create a distributor exemption to the immunity provided 
in section 230.  Second, the court rejected the court of appeals’s use of three factors 
in its analysis: the meaning of “publisher,” the legislative history of the CDA, and the 
practical implications of notice liability.     
The court next considered the definition of the term “user.”  First, the court 
noted that the court of appeals’s “distributor” liability theory did not distinguish 
between Internet service providers and individuals; the court then made comparisons 
between the two.  The court noted that the term “user” is not defined in the statute 
and proceeded to determine the meaning of the term by using the rules of statutory 
construction.   The court also noted that Congress consistently referred to “users” of 
interactive computer services and specifically included “individuals” in section 
230(b)(3).  The court stated there was no reason to believe that Congress meant the 
term to have a different meaning in section 230(c)(1) and concluded that the 
defendant, although an individual, was therefore a “user” under the CDA.    
Finally, the court analyzed whether there was a distinction between active 
and passive Internet use since one of the plaintiffs urged the court to restrict the 
statutory term “user” to those who engage in passive use.  The plaintiff contended 
that passive users would include those who merely receive offensive information, 
along with those who screen and remove such information.  The plaintiff further 
contended that active users are those who actively post or republish information on 
the Internet and that they are “information content providers” unprotected by the 
statutory immunity.   The court held that Congress intended the term “user” in the 
CDA to refer to “anyone using an interactive computer service, without 
distinguishing between active and passive use.”   
The court’s holding in Barrett establishes that Internet intermediaries are 
exempt from defamation liability for republication.  This is an important holding for 
a modern society where electronic media such as Internet forums, newsgroups, and 
chat rooms are becoming increasingly prevalent in everyday life.  As this trend 
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continues, business practitioners need to be concerned with whether they could be 
held liable for their participation in this developing medium. 
 
 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 
 
The Scope of the Anti-Retaliation Provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 Extends Beyond Employers’ Workplace or Employment-Related 
Actions Against Employees.  Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 
S.Ct. 2405 (2006). 
By Matthew Avery 
The Supreme Court recently held that the anti-retaliation provision of section 
704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not coterminous with the substantive 
discrimination provision and, therefore, is not limited to employer’s actions affecting 
an employee’s terms, conditions, or status of employment that occur at the 
workplace.  Specifically, the Court held that a reassignment of duties without a 
demotion, as well as a thirty-seven-day unpaid suspension (though later rescinded 
with back pay), could potentially constitute retaliatory discrimination within the 
provision’s scope.  The Court also held that the anti-retaliation provision requires 
showing that a reasonable employee would have found the employer’s challenged 
action materially adverse—the action could well have dissuaded a reasonable 
employee from taking protected action against his or her employer. 
 In September 1997, Sheila White was working as a forklift operator in the 
Maintenance of Way department at Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway 
Company’s Tennessee Yard.  White, the only female in her department, complained 
to company officials that her immediate supervisor had repeatedly told her that 
women should not be working in that department and made inappropriate and 
insulting remarks to her in front of the men in her department.  Burlington 
disciplined the supervisor and simultaneously removed White from forklift duty, 
assigning her to dirtier and more arduous track laborer tasks.  White filed a 
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), 
asserting that her reassignment amounted to unlawful gender-based discrimination 
and retaliation.  
 Several days after filing her complaint with the EEOC, White had a 
disagreement with her immediate supervisor, and White was immediately suspended 
without pay.  White invoked internal grievance procedures, which resulted in 
Burlington concluding that she had not been insubordinate.  White was then 
reinstated and awarded back pay for the 37 days she was suspended.  
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 White subsequently filed a claim in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Tennessee, asserting that the reassignment and thirty-seven-day 
unpaid suspension amounted to unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  A jury found in favor of White, awarding her 
compensatory damages.  On appeal, a Sixth Circuit panel initially reversed and found 
for Burlington on the retaliation claims, but the full court of appeals, later hearing 
the matter en banc, affirmed the district court’s judgment in White’s favor.  
In deciding the matter, the members of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
differed in opinion as to the proper standard to apply in determining retaliatory 
discrimination.  Several circuit courts disagreed on how close a relationship must 
exist between the retaliatory action and employment for it to be actionable under the 
provision.  The Sixth Circuit majority applied the same standard for retaliation that 
they applied to a substantive discrimination offense, holding that the challenged 
action must result in an adverse effect on the terms, conditions, or benefits of 
employment.  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this dispute among the 
circuit courts.  The Court held that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII was not 
to be construed as narrowly as the substantive discrimination provision because the 
limiting words found in the latter provision are conspicuously absent from the 
former.  The Court held that the purposes of the two provisions differ, and the 
intended result of the substantive discrimination provision is a workplace free from 
discrimination.  The intended result of the anti-retaliation provision, on the other 
hand, is the prevention of employer interference with employees’ efforts to secure or 
advance enforcement of the Act; there are many effective forms of retaliation that 
would not be precluded under a narrower interpretation of the provision.  
The Court also held that the anti-retaliation provision covers only employer 
actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or 
applicant.  This holding requires a plaintiff to show that the challenged action “may 
well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”  The standard is phrased generally because the significance of any 
retaliatory act may depend entirely on the particular circumstances surrounding the 
act.  
Employment law practitioners should take note that the definition of 
“retaliation” under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision has been interpreted to cover 
employer actions that are not directly work-related.  The standard of a “reasonable 
employee” for the materiality requirement is a very general one that is highly 
susceptible to such factors as the individual employee’s history and circumstances.  
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Accordingly, employers should be advised to exercise caution and to follow 
established procedures to avoid adverse actions. 
___________________ 
Where a Management Retention Agreement Provides for Voluntary 
Termination of Employment for Changes in the Nature and Scope of 
Authority, Justification of Such Changes does not Present a Dispute in 
Material Fact Such that Summary Judgment may be Avoided.  Gray v. Shoney’s, 
LLC, No. M2005-00923-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 710 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Oct. 31, 2006). 
By Jonathan W. Robbins 
 At issue in Gray v. Shoney’s, LLC, is whether an executive who voluntarily 
terminates his employment based on conditions contained in a Management 
Retention Agreement (“MRA”) is entitled to severance compensation.  This case was 
decided by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Division, upon appeal from 
summary judgment from the Chancery Court for Davidson County. 
 While experiencing financial difficulties and facing the prospect of a change 
of control, Shoney’s, Inc. secured MRAs with certain executive employees in order 
to induce their loyalty through the turbulent times. Bernard Gray, then Chief 
Information Officer, entered into one of these MRAs, which provided a liberal 
severance package if, within two years of a change in control, he voluntarily 
terminated his employment for good reason.  Among the various descriptions of 
what would constitute “good reason” under the MRA was the provision that a 
“significant change in the nature or scope of Executive’s authority” constituted good 
reason. 
 After a 2002 change of control, Gray’s entire department was moved from 
being directly under the control of Shoney’s, Inc., to being under the control of a 
wholly-owned subsidiary, Captain D’s Restaurants.  After the change, Gray reported 
to the Operations President of Captain D’s rather than directly to the Chairman of 
the Board of Shoney’s, Inc., as he had previously done.  Furthermore, Gray was no 
longer allowed to begin or to control research and development projects without 
prior approval, to make any expenditures without prior approval, to sell used 
equipment without prior approval, to control the customer comment line and 
Mystery Shopper programs, or to exercise discretion in certain personnel matters.  
Based on all these changes, Gray submitted his resignation, claiming “good reason” 
as defined by the MRA and seeking the severance package also contained in the 
MRA.  Shoney’s, Inc. declined his severance package.  At trial, the Chancellor 
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concluded that significant changes had occurred and granted summary judgment on 
behalf of Gray.   
 At issue before the court of appeals is whether genuine disputes regarding 
material facts exist as to the “good reasons” for which Gray contends he is entitled 
to terminate his employment and receive severance compensation.  Finding that no 
material facts were in dispute as to whether Shoney’s had made a significant change 
in the nature or scope of Gray’s authority, the grant of summary judgment was 
affirmed. 
 In interpreting the MRA, the court accorded the contractual term 
“significant” its natural and ordinary meaning, which it defined as a change that has 
meaning or is likely to have effect on the nature or scope of his authority.  In Gray’s 
motion for summary judgment, evidence was provided of significant changes in his 
research and development authority, spending authority, authority to sell used 
equipment, authority over programs, personnel discretion, and changes in the 
structure of his department and the reporting tier.  However, Shoney’s provided no 
material facts bearing on whether the changes in the nature or scope of Gray’s 
authority were significant.  Shoney’s response provided many persuasive 
justifications for these changes based on the troubled financial structure of the 
company; however, these arguments did not address whether the changes were 
significant.  Describing the arguments provided by Shoney’s as a “factual detour, like 
a trip through the soup and salad bar,” when more substance, “like a healthy portion 
of country fried steak,” was required, the court found that there were no material 
facts in dispute concerning whether a significant change occurred and upheld the 
grant of summary judgment. 
 Based on the holding in this case, it is clear that, while justifications for 
corporate actions are persuasive, they are only a “factual detour” where an active 
MRA provides that good cause can be shown based simply upon significant change 
in nature or scope of authority.  Where there is no provision that allows for 
temporary or justified changes, the nature of these changes is not important.  Thus, 
when drafting and negotiating a MRA, the practitioner should always remain mindful 
of exactly what type of provision is desired and under what circumstances and 
conditions voluntary termination of employment will result in severance 
compensation. 
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TAXATION 
 
D.C. Circuit Stuns Tax Lawyers by Declaring I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) 
Unconstitutional for Taxing Compensatory Damages for Emotional Distress. 
Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
By John L. Fuller 
In August 2006, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stunned both the tax bar 
and constitutional lawyers alike with its opinion in Murphy v. IRS.  A unanimous 
panel declared unconstitutional the application of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) that excludes 
from personal income damages received as compensation for “personal physical 
injuries or physical sickness,” while permitting the taxation of damages awarded for 
mental distress and loss of reputation.  The opinion firmly questions the income 
taxing authority of Congress as well as the scope of the Sixteenth Amendment itself.  
Needless to say, many in the legal community are bewildered by the D.C. Circuit’s 
conclusions.  For now, however, any potential effects of Murphy have been put on 
hold.  On December 22, 2006, the D.C. Circuit, sua sponte, vacated its previous 
opinion and scheduled the case for oral argument on April 23, 2007.  Though the 
ultimate outcome is uncertain, a summary of the facts of the case and an analysis of 
this extraordinary opinion is useful to illustrate how a common understanding of our 
income taxing mechanism can be called into question by a clever argument and a 
ready court.   
 Murphy v. IRS arose out of a suit to recover income taxes paid on 
compensatory damages awarded in an employment discrimination suit.  In 1994, 
while employed by the New York Air National Guard (“NYANG”), Marrita Murphy 
alerted state authorities to environmental hazards on a NYANG air base.  As a 
result, Murphy was allegedly “blacklisted” and received unfavorable references from 
the NYANG to potential employers.  Murphy subsequently filed a complaint with 
the Department of Labor which found in her favor and remanded the case to an 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to determine appropriate compensatory damages. 
 During the damages phase, Murphy presented evidence of “somatic” and 
“emotional” injuries, including bruxism, an involuntary grinding of the teeth 
associated with stress causing permanent tooth damage.  After finding that Murphy 
had suffered from “‘physical manifestations of stress’ including ‘anxiety attacks, 
shortness of breath, and dizziness,’” the ALJ awarded compensatory damages 
totaling $70,000, including $45,000 for “emotional distress or mental anguish” and 
$25,000 for “injury to professional reputation.”  These findings and awards were 
affirmed by the Department of Labor Administrative Review Board in 1999. 
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 In 2000, Murphy reported the $70,000 on her tax return and paid $20,665 in 
income taxes on the award.  Soon thereafter, she filed an amended return seeking a 
refund for the taxes previously paid on the damages award.  Murphy based her claim 
on her belief that she had received her award “on account of personal physical 
injuries” and, therefore, the award was excluded from gross income under section 
104(a)(2).  Ms. Murphy presented her medical records in support of her position.  
The IRS denied her claim on the basis that her medical records were not sufficient to 
prove her damages were awarded for “physical injury” in light of the ALJ’s decision 
citing “emotional distress or mental anguish.”  Murphy then sued the IRS and the 
United States in the District Court for the District of Columbia.   
 Murphy argued, first, that her compensatory award was received for 
“personal physical injuries” and should be excluded from gross income under section 
104(a)(2).  In the alternative, she argued that section 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional in 
its application by excluding from gross income compensation for “physical injuries” 
while permitting compensation for “emotional distress” to be taxed.  The District 
Court denied Murphy’s claims on the merits and granted summary judgment for the 
Government and the IRS.  The D.C. Circuit Court accepted the case for de novo 
review. 
 The circuit court first determined that the district court did not have proper 
jurisdiction over the IRS as a defendant.  Citing federal agency immunity statutes, the 
circuit court held that the IRS could not be sued as an agency under these 
circumstances and should have been dismissed.  The United States remained a 
proper defendant.   
The court then evaluated section 104(a)(2) and its application to Murphy’s 
awards.  Murphy again contended that her award, regardless of the ALJ’s 
characterization, should fall within the meaning of section 104(a)(2) because of the 
physical attributes of her injuries.  The Government countered by pointing out that 
the statute’s language had been consistently interpreted by courts to require a “strong 
causal connection” between damages to be excluded and a personal physical injury 
or physical sickness upon which the underlying suit was based.  In other words, only 
damages awarded because of personal physical injuries or physical sickness could be 
excluded from gross income.  Though the ALJ considered the physical 
manifestations of Murphy’s injuries, the damages awarded were expressly “for 
emotional distress or mental anguish” and “for injury to professional reputation.”  
These causations, argued the Government, were expressly non-physical and, 
therefore, did not fall under the exclusionary language of section 104(a)(2).  The 
circuit court agreed and affirmed for the government on this first substantive claim. 
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 The circuit court then, after a lengthy discussion of Murphy’s constitutional 
claim, concluded that Murphy’s award was in fact not income and, therefore, the 
failure of section 104(a)(2) to exclude Murphy’s award from gross income resulted in 
an unconstitutional taxation.  The circuit court held that, because compensation for 
personal injuries of any kind are awarded in order to make a person whole, they are 
not awarded “in lieu of” something not ordinarily taxed—to wit, one’s well being—
and, therefore, cannot be considered income under the Sixteenth Amendment.  The 
circuit court arrived at its conclusion through an originalist interpretation of the 
Sixteenth Amendment supported by the earliest versions of the Internal Revenue 
Code that did not distinguish between physical and non-physical injuries.  Offered as 
additional support were an opinion of the Attorney General and a decision of the 
Department of the Treasury, both issued in 1918, that suggested compensation for 
personal injuries was not considered taxable income at that time.   
 The Government strongly disagreed, claiming that the historical exclusion of 
compensation for personal injuries did not suggest a boundary of Congress’s taxing 
authority.  Instead, it represented merely a policy of not taxing a certain form of 
compensation.  Furthermore, the Government stated that Congress could repeal 
section 104(a)(2) altogether and tax compensation for all personal injuries while 
remaining within its taxing authority under the Sixteenth Amendment.  This position 
is derived from the understanding that the Sixteenth Amendment granted Congress 
broad authority to “tax all gains except those specifically exempted,” and the 
conclusion that monetary compensation received for whatever reason represents a 
taxable “undeniable accession to wealth.”  Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 
426, 430 (1955) (interpreting the predecessor of I.R.C. § 61(a)).   
 The circuit court responded to this argument stating, “[W]e reject the 
Government’s breathtakingly expansive claim of congressional power under the 
Sixteenth Amendment . . . [which] simply does not authorize the Congress to tax as 
‘incomes’ every sort of revenue a taxpayer may receive.”  This statement, 
demonstrating the extent of the Court’s opposition to the Government’s position, 
appears to indicate a serious conflict over the most fundamental of tax questions: 
What is income?   
It is difficult to predict the outcome of Murphy v. IRS “Part II” when the case 
is revisited later this year.  In the meantime, “Part I” raises some serious questions 
about the current tax code and its attendant mechanisms.  Was this unexpected 
decision an extreme result of overly complex code language?  Will it encourage the 
IRS or Congress to review and revise ambiguous code sections?  And, ultimately, will 
Murphy v. IRS conclude with a decisive Supreme Court opinion refining the 
definition of income, something the Supreme Court has done little of since Glenshaw 
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Glass?  We eagerly await the answers to these and other questions raised by Murphy v. 
IRS.  
 
 
